Caring-About Virtual Pets:
An Ethical Interpretation of Tamagotchi
Annie O’Rourke
"Tam agotchi is more than a toy, it is a learning device. It teaches
people to be responsible - to care fo r something - like a pet."
Mary W oodw ard, spokesperson fo r Bandai Corp., U.S.Division1
"The real referent o f the gismo is nature in its entirety reinvented
in accordance with the technological reality principle - a total
simulacrum o f an autom ated nature."
Jean Baudrillard1
2

A

prevailing sense of anxiety and ambiguity clouds my
thinking when I think of the reality of virtual pets. W hat
I feel towards them has been instrumental in the writing
of this article, it has been a sticking point that has forced me to
confront whether or not they really matter, and whether I care.
Virtual pets are things I would rather did not enter my world, and
yet they are here and have affected me and many others.3 This
one small toy has opened up a space for a whole new generation
of toys that are so called 'responsive' entertainment.
The launch of the virtual pet Tamagotchi was phenomenally
successful, seemingly striking a combination of elements which
sparked a feeling of its novelty. This novelty operated beyond the
usual trajectory of wonder at the close proximity of its simulation
of real life. Given that this toy (in its material manifestation) is
relatively simple and seemingly benign, the key to interest in
Tamagotchi resides elsewhere.
Tamagotchi is an electronic figure that represents a 'pet' on a
small (lx l inch) screen. The screen is housed in an egg sized
plastic mould that has about four control buttons which the
1 Mary Woodward quoted by Rebecca Eisenberg 'Bandai's Golden Egg', National
Netly News, March 21, 1997.
2 Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects , Translated by James Benedict, (Verso,
New York, 1996), p.116.
3 Tamagotchi has been an extremely popular, extremely 'faddish' game. The
manufactures have sold 20 million worldwide. Added to this are the many
'clones’ and other types of computer pets, a fast growing industry accelerated by
the net.
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player uses to interact with the 'live' pet on the screen. The pet
(the Tamagotchi) will periodically call (by beeping) its owner to
feed it, play with it, give it medicine and occasionally punish it.
The game involved is one of keeping the pet alive for as long as
possible by finding the right combinations of inputs that ensure
its general well-being. If it all goes wrong (as it did in my case) the
'pet' will die, but you can get a new one by re-setting the program
very easily. Although you have to be responsive to its needs,
ultimately you have power over the life and death of this 'virtual'
other, with no 'real' responsibility attached.
However, if we step back from the media and academic hyperbole
surrounding 'the virtual' for a moment, we can start to see the
various trajectories which make possible the arrival of such
games as Tamagotchi. They have not arrived out of nowhere (or
out of 'Planet Tamagotchi- somewhere in cyberspace' as Bandai
Corp. have marketed). Computer games are rife, and ’animals' are
more popular than ever.4 Put in the context of current lifestyles
for the targeted group of consumers (of digitised, broken up time,
high mobility, and a sense of individual ineffectiveness)
Tamagotchi starts to make sense. Rather than just taking this
sense as therefore being naturally meaningful, I seek to interrupt
the trajectory and look more carefully at what and who is being
affected by such inventions, and perhaps more interestingly, by
their marketing. This article is thus an attempt to 'respond' to the
phenomenon of virtual pets (especially the variety which
launched the concept and the fad: Tamagotchi) beyond the
confines of the game itself. Doing so is more than a one or two
button push.
My approach has been hermeneutic,5 for the way in which virtual
pets work (and are made meaningful) is through a complex
process of interpretation, signification and imagination.
4 It is not that we are increasingly in contact with animals, rather, it seems that
the opposite is true - the further away we are from them in an everyday sense,
the more they are represented and consumed.
5 This hermeneutic approach has been informed by readings of Hans George
Gadamer, Martin Heidegger and Paul Ricoeur. Specifically, I am interested in
their unravelling of the process of interpretation into what Gadamer describes as
a 'fusion of horizons' (a meeting of the contextual understanding of the
interpreter with that of the interpreted). Hans George Gadamer, Truth and
Method , Translated by William Glen-Doepel, (Sheed & Ward, London, 1975),
pp. 273-274. For an overview of Twentieth century hermeneutic approaches to
texts, see: Richard E Palmer, Hermeneutics, (North West University Press,
Evanston, 1969).
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Hermeneutics is involved in unpicking the processes of
interpretation, it looks at the sites of mediation (for example, at
texts) because the possibility of a pure experience of 'reality' is
questioned.6 In order to uncover what is at stake with the 'virtual'
mediated experience, we have to also look at what it is simulating
more carefully, that is, at the concept of 'reality' that supports it.
The game Tamagotchi can be thought of as a 'text' which has a
particular world that has been programmed into its computer.7
The world of Tamagotchi is encountered by the interpreter (the
player) who brings an 'historically operative consciousness'8 (a
world) which shapes her or his interpretation and experience. In
the interpretative encounter, a ’fusion of horizons’9 between
these two worlds occurs, and a meaningful relation arrives. This
is the ’effect' of Tamagotchi, the moment when its world moves
out in front of the text itself into the field of life and action. It is
through interpretation and imagination that the Tamagotchi
housed in the plastic egg becomes meaningful as 'pet'.
The trajectory of this article follows the idea of 'worlding' and
encounters between subjects and objects quite closely. In the break
up of this text, I am mimicking a heuristic devised by Sandra

6 Paul Ricoeur in describing hermeneutics claims that it involves a 'general
mistrust concerning the claim of any philosophy to reestablish the primacy of
intuition, immediacy, as though we could have before us in our minds the pure
presence of "what is" He then goes on to say that 'the word hermeneutics will
be the task of the explication of all the symbolic systems which relate us
indirectly to reality, whatever this reality may be. And this will be, I suppose,
one of the stakes, that is, one of the ontological premises.' Charles E Reagan,
’Interviews, 1982’ in Paul Ricoeur: His Life and Work, (University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1996), p.l.
7 The notion of ’world’ is central to a hermeneutic understanding of the process of
reading and imagination. Richard Kearney describes hermeneutics as being 'not
just confined to the objective structural analysis of the texts, nor to the subjective
existential analysis of the authors of the texts. Its primary concern is with the
worlds which these texts and authors open up.' Richard Kearney ’Paul Ricoeur
and the Hermeneutic Imagination’ in T.Peter Kemp & David Rasmussen, eds.,
The Narrative Path: the Later works of Paul Ricoeur, (MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1991), p. 6.
8 ’Historically Operative Consciousness’ (or ’prejudice) is the Gadamerian way
of expressing what Heidegger terms a subject's 'forestructure', that is, the culture,
history and language through which a subject learns to make the 'world'
meaningful. Because of this 'making' the world can never be thought of as
entirely outside the subject. For Gadamer's description of prejudice see Truth and
Method, p.237.
9 The 'fusion of horizons' is a meeting of the contextual understanding of the
interpreter with that of the interpreted. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 273274.
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Schneiders in her feminist hermeneutic reading of the Bible.101
Here the complex interpretive moment is broken up into three
worlds: the world of the text, the world behind the text and the
world before (or in front of) the text. Section One (the world of the
text) reads Tamagotchi as a text that has a structure and narrative
that mimics the temporality we usually associate with 'life'. Here
my research was taken from my own experience of the game as
well as interviews with other people who have come into contact
with Tamagotchi, most of these were primary school aged
children. Section two will look at the world behind the text: that
is, asking what it was that gave rise to the text and the
relationship of these factors to the text itself. In the case of
Tamagotchi I will focus specifically on the 'caring' relation it
commodifies and makes virtual by drawing on its relations to
children, pets, and computer games. Section Three looks at the
world before the text, that is, the world that has shifted and
changed as a consequence of the encounter between the
interpreter and the text. As the marketed image of Tamagotchi
claims, it is in fact a Teaming device'. But what exactly is being
taught and leamt needs to be examined more closely and radically
questioned by someone who 'cares’.

Section 1. The World of the Text:
The Consumption of Tamagotchi
"If you keep your Tamagotchi full and happy it will grow into a
cute, happy, cyber creature. I f you neglect it, it will grow into an
unattractive alien." (Bandai Instruction Booklet)
"You don't just play with your Tamagotchi when you feel like it it will let you know when it wants you. It will beep and cry for
you, and its sounds will get louder and louder until you give it
attention. If you ignore it, Tamagotchi will misbehave, or die."11
In order to understand Tamagotchi the players have to enter into
its world and be open to its meaning and structure. As readers of
this text, we also have to be open to it so that we can ultimately
uncover its ethical effects. Because I am interested in the ways in
which Tamagotchi are interpreted and experienced, my research
in this area has focused on my own experiences of the game,
10 Sandra M. Schneiders, The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament
as Sacred Scripture (Harper, San Francisco, 1991).
11 Eisenberg, 'Bandai's Golden Egg'.
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interviews with children who either use them or know of them,
and web based research (chat rooms, personal and company
websites).
Although this game is eminently repeatable (you can simply press
reset if your current 'pet' dies) it is not an experience I would
personally wish to repeat. My ability to respond to its beeps (in all
manner of contexts) lasted only a short time. After a while, I
basically programmed it to 'sleep' (to minimise its beeps), and it
died soon after. I pressed 'reset' and got a brand new pet, the last
one was soon forgotten. This pet lasted slightly longer (I had
learnt a few tricks), but ultimately it suffered a similar fate to the
first. Is this a reflection on my poor ability to mother and nurture?
Should I be feeling guilty? The context of my use of the game had
almost completely pre-figured my experience of it - I was
researching an article, I was already cynical, I did not 'believe'. But
more than this, my ontological experience of the object made it
very easy for me not to care, it is small and plastic, it is very easy
to make it 'go away'. Nevertheless, I still did not feel entirely
comfortable in admitting that I had let it die so easily, and the
children I spoke to were appalled at my lack of remorse.
To believe in this object's 'life', one necessarily has to construct a
kind of narrative around its existence. This narrative involves
not only the game itself, but also your role in relation to it (ie as a
mother or carer). Adults whose children were not allowed to take
them to school were made into 'babysitters', and people who
deliberately killed theirs were named on a number of websites as
abusers' and 'torturers'. Virtual Pets mean very little in
themselves (as figures on a screeen), it is their narrativisation
(primarily in the head of the user) which makes them become a
'pet' and forces a particular kind of behaviour.
Paul Ricoeur describes narrative as a grasping together of events
to make a temporal whole.12 This 'grasping together' is an active,
interpretative function of the imagination, and thus has to do
directly with the 'worlding' of the interpreter. However, a certain
openness towards the 'story' of the text must be given by the
interpreter, and this means a willingness to follow the temporal
and spatial dimension given by the text. There are certain rules,
structures, and usually a strong temporal dimension which are
12 Richard Kearney 'Paul Ricouer and the Hermeneutic Imagination' in Kemp &
Rasmussen, The Narrative Path: The Later Works of Paul Ricoeur, p.18.
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designed by the maker of the text (in this case the designers of
Tamagotchi) with the user's experience and ability to interpret the
text in mind.
Tamagotchi simulates an organic being by presenting something
which is seemingly operating under its own temporality (it beeps
at you when it wants you). It mimics the narrative most often
ascribed to organic beings in the West, that of an inexorable
movement from birth through to death. This trajectory is the
familiar narrative structure of 'beginning, middle and end' as
explicated by Aristotle.13 The designers of virtual pets have
imitated this structure and made it into the game itself.
In the case of Tamagotchi, the 'game' is to keep the pet alive as
long as possible. The responses which you can give to the 'cries' of
the Tamagotchi are limited by the computer's program and
number of button options (there are usually four buttons with
sub-programs, so there are approximately 16 things you can 'do' to
your Tamagotchi). Figuring out the rules of the program and your
particular role is the challenge of the game.
Tamagotchi was first discovered in Japan. Tamagotchi
hatch from tiny eggs after travelling millions of
lightyears through cyberspace. With proper care and
feeding (accomplished by pushing buttons on the eggs)
Tamagotchi quickly grow into adorable virtual reality
pets in a wide variety of shapes and personalities.14
Bandai have constructed the myth that Tamagotchi were created
independently of their physical design and manufacture. The
'world' from which Tamagotchi come from is imagined as
completely immaterial, just as the pets themselves are also
immaterial. Because you can 'reset' Tamagotchi and get a new
one, the egg shaped casing is like a cage or nest in which you
temporarily nurture the alien pet-creature. The origins and
ontological experience of the this egg (as plastic and silicon) are
completely erased by the mythology created by its marketing15 and
by their wide interpretation as being 'virtual'.
13 J. Hillis Miller 'Narrative' in F, Lentricchia & T.McLaughlin, eds., Critical
Terms for Literary Theory (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990), p. 66.
14 Bandai, Tamagotchi Home Page 1997
15 Jean Baudrillard in The System of Objects writes 'in order to consume it, the
object has to first become a sign'. As I outlined at the end of section one, the user is
consuming the idea of the animal and computer as pet.
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Once the egg has been hatched and the Tamagotchi is bom onto
the screen it is now up to the user to Took after' it. One of the
many websites offering helpful 'mothering' hints for Tamagotchi
states:
Tamagotchi require lots of tender loving care, in the
form of frequent feedings and attention. Hang on there,
the baby stage doesn't last very long. They mature very
quickly, one human day equals one Tamagotchi year.
The internal clock of the Tamagotchi mimics the different
lifespans of 'real' pets as interpreted by humans. As a child, it was
a source of continual delight to figure out the 'human age' of
various pets in order to determine their relation to me (if they
were older or younger, a child, teenager or old man).
Tamagotchi are programmed to change their weight, get older and
eventually die.There is a 'handy' statistics measure (of happiness,
hunger, health and weight levels) for the user to determine the
relative doses of affection, punishment, food, play, sleep and
medicine to give to the pet (through pushing various
combinations of buttons). Can our relationships with pets be so
easily characterised and simply programmed? Consider the
following description of the human/pet relationship:
Like children, the animal must be cared for: fed and
watered, kept from eating dangerous foods and objects,
bathed, groomed, protected against the elements,
clothed when necessary, brought to the doctors and
spoken for at the doctors. Like children they are petted,
stroked, and played with at the will of the owner, their
range of motion being limited and sex life controlled.16
What this quote reveals is the connection between behaviour
towards children (parenting and nurturing) and animals in the
form of pets (which I will analyse in more detail in section two). If
we use this same quote to think through the role that Tamagotchi
has simulated we could just as easily substitute 'the animal' for
'the Tamagotchi', the clever marketing and design of the machine
by the manufacturers have almost taken such a description of the
role of pet keeping practices and mimicked it with an electronic
lifeworld interface. Tamagotchi reveals that what it is simulating
16 A.M. Beck. & A.H. Katcher, Between Pets and People (G.P.Putnam, New
York, 1983), p. 60.
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is already somewhat programmed and constructed by our
narratives. As will be further examined in section two, the
relations of nurturance towards pets and children are naturalised
by making them virtual, they are taken as the 'real' referent to
which the virtual refers.
The creation of Tamagotchi does not just stop at the screen's
image of the hatched egg, and the marketing of Tamagotchi does
not stop at its point of purchase. The reasons for purchasing the
Tamagotchi are often due to social pressure and a responsiveness
to advertising. One eight year old girl told me that after she saw
the ad on TV for Tamagotchi, she: 'had to have one because I love
animals'. The connection between the sign of the animal and the
game of the virtual pet had been successful and the purchase
made. Another described the fad hitting their school with the
following narrative 'It all started when Sophia's Dad went to
Japan and brought her back a Tamagotchi. She took it to school,
then everyone had to have one'. Those who I interviewed who
did not personally own a Tamagotchi or virtual pet knew almost
as much about them, they had entered the everyday folklore of
the primary school.
Because it is small, it can be carried on the person everywhere.
You are thus always responsible for it and have no real excuse for
it becoming sick or dying. Addictive and obsessional behaviour
towards Tamagotchi is encouraged by the very game itself which
forces the user to re-enter its world intermittently throughout the
day with its constant reminders for attention. A salesperson in a
Sydney toy shop described them as 'initially quite addictive, but
you eventually get sick of them and stop caring.' Many other
interviewees and comments on web pages followed a similar path
of desire, purchase, initial excitement, addiction and emotional
attachment, then annoyance and finally detachment. Similarly,
’real' pets only stay cute and appealing to humans for a short
period of time. Once the initial novelty of the 'other' as young
and manipulable wears off (they grow up and are sometimes then
abandoned), the everyday chore of 'looking after' ceases to be so
romantic.
The illusion of an organic 'other' was uncovered by one user as
being nothing other than a strenuous alarm clock. He complained
that when two friends set them at the same time, they then
beeped and demanded at the same time for the rest of their
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'lives'.17 This, he deemed, was not responsive enough, the
illusion or organicism was unmasked as a set program with
minimal variables. One child at the primary school was excited by
the promise that 'if you treat it well, it will live forever'.
Unfortunately the confines of a two digit time system means that
they have to in fact 'die' at 99 years (that is 99 days in human
time), rather like the problem of the millennium bug. It is
thought that most die within two weeks of their 'creation'.
You cannot simply turn it off. In order to end the game you have
to 'kill' the Tamagotchi by neglect, or by bringing out of balance
the various inputs at your disposal (feeding, punishing, medicine,
bathing, pooh cleaning, making it sleep etc). The movement
towards death that Tamagotchi imitate is a carefully constructed
narrative both on and off the small screen. The image of death
was changed by the manufacturer Bandai when it was released
into the U.S. market. U.S. trial users were somewhat disturbed by
the Japanese version of death which had an image of a cross and a
gravestone. It was changed to an image of an angel, and the
mythology of 'Tamagotchi land' and cyberheaven was elaborated
upon in the booklet and websites. There is a 'Tamagotchi
Graveyard' on the web where you can post your dead
Tamagotchi's details (name, age, favourite habits) with a message
to send to it in cyberheaven.18 The 'ritual exploration of life and
death' (which according to Turkle is the function of playing with
computer games19 as expressed through games such as
Tamagotchi carries some fairly hefty emotional baggage. One user
stated passionately: 'Those who say we feel no pain at resetting the
game have obviously not raised a Tamagotchi on their own.'
And yet when the user is finally bored of the game, its material
’death’ is not even noticed. All the emotional energy and interest
is in the imaginary pet as represented by the small figure on the
screen.
17 Glen McCrae, Don't Bother Buying a tamagotchi, Website, August 1997.
18 Most entries were concerned with expressing their love for the pet 'God bless
Linda, I bet she's having fun up on planet Tamagotchi/, another repeated T’m
Sorry' two hundred times, and someone else said 'To Devon my worst
Tamagotchi, you will never be missed cause I hated you because you always
beeped in the night even when I was trying to sleep, hope you go to hell and rot
you little disgusting Tamagotchi.'
19 Turkle's thesis is that the use of computer games is to play with ownership and
control over something which frightens us and is potentially beyond us (ie
computers). She writes that 'the children allow the toy its most autonomous
behaviour, and then, when it is most like a living thing, they kill it.' Sherry
Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Simon & Schuster,
New York, 1984), pp. 34 -38.
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One vehemently anti-Tamagotchi website (and there are a few) is
called 'Smash Tamagotchi'. Its writers urged people to send their
Tamagotchi to them with the promise that they will be smashed.
Interestingly, the same writers later reflected that although they
had had many 'hits' (visits to the web page) no one had actually
sent them to be smashed. What this illustrates is that people do
not actually think of Tamagotchi as material, the Tamagotchi
creature is ephemeral and un-smashable. A neo-luddite response
to Tamagotchi is clearly not an entirely appropriate reaction to the
power of the virtual.
The narrative structure encountered in the world of the text is
limited to the users immaterial experience of the Tamagotchi.
The material life-span (or life cycle) of the object is concealed by
this narrative. But this life-span, although concealed, is still
present in an ontological sense. Although we may not be fully
conscious of it, it designs our experiences, our ability to care and
be responsive to the virtual creature.
None of the children I interviewed mentioned what had
happened to the Tamagotchi object once they were sick of the
game, it is almost as if it is not even 'seen'.20 Once the program
had been figured out, the challenge of everyday care was
eventually just too everyday. The initial shine of the virtual (in
its proximity to the real) is dulled by its repetitious nature, much
the same way as children (and adults) tire of pets once they are no
longer young, cute and novel. Responses to the pet by the user
(who after all exists in both the world of the text and outside of it)
can be controlled, managed, and made to disappear. The
imaginary which prompted the interest in the object has been
consumed and the 'care' that Tamagotchi professes to teach is
similarly abandoned.
There is a disjuncture between the world of the text in its
imaginative realm and the world of the text in its ontological or
material domain. The material waste produced by such fads is not
20 The children I spoke to at a primary school were confused by my questioning of
what they did with them after they got sick of them. Most admitted that their
Tamagotchi's had joined the other 'junk' and discarded toys in a cupboard or
under the bed. They were much more interested in describing how they had
gotten rid of the immaterial Tamagotchi through various methods of starvation,
burying under pillows and turning the sound down so that they would 'not have to
hear them die'.
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taken seriously; the waste of time (which also has material effects)
can span anywhere from two days (in my case), to a couple of
years. Although a Tamagotchi death is experienced as immaterial,
its material reality (which has been concealed) forecloses our
response to its worlding. It is the ontological/material experience
of Tamagotchi which finally teaches us not to care about
Tamagotchi's well being.

Section Two: The World Behind the Text
"What is said stands against the background o f the vast unsaid to
which it is related."- Hans George Gadamer21
In order to understand the phenomenon of Tamagotchi we need
to re-contextualise it into the life-world from which it arrived.
Rather than getting carried away with its novelty (an approach
which itself has an ethical effect22) I want to make apparent some
of the different elements which make it meaningful. To do this in
its entirety is an impossible task (for it will arrive to different
people in a multitude of ways) but there are some dominant
themes and discourses which can be deciphered as the nodal
points from which Tamagotchi was configured. The elements I
have identified are specifically related to the broader questions
that I have brought to the text: that is care, ethics and a concern
about virtual 'otherness'.
In order to uncover the unsaid or background that makes
Tamagotchi meaningful, we have to look at the 'reality' that
Tamagotchi is making virtual. This dynamic itself is not innocent
however, it effects the elements that are being represented. It is
my proposal that by making a 'virtual' version of a 'real' image or
object, the reality status of that object becomes naturalised and
fixed. The virtual, (which is defined as the 'almost' rather than
the artificial - which is the 'fake'23) as a technologised entity,
21 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.456.
22 Gadamer writes 'What changes forces itself far more attention than what
stays the same. That is the general law of our intellectual life. Hence the
perspectives that come from the experience of historical change are always in
danger of distortion because they forget the hidden constants.' (my emphasis)
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. xiii.
23 Schirmarcher describes how the term 'artificial' (which implies the fake)
has been replaced by the buzzword 'virtual' (which is the 'almost') in
contemporary society. He writes 'This would certainly meet the much lesser
expectations we have in this field nowadays: "almost" life, "almost" reality,
"almost" intelligence would leave our traditional world view intact, merely
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makes possible a repeatable experience of the 'nature' it is
replicating. To revisit the quote at the opening of this article by
Baudrillard, the real referent outside of the virtual (ie nature) is
actually re-invented as a simulacrum of an automated nature.
Tamagotchi contains a relatively simple computer program that is
easily learnt. It arrives in a space whose occupiers are by and large
computer literate, televisualised, urbanised and used to a certain
quality of graphics and interactivity. The appeal of Tamagotchi
cannot then be put down to a simple fascination with the highly
technological. Its graphics and virtuality are similar to that found
on a digital wrist watch or even on a calculator and come
nowhere near being an 'almost' animal. The novelty and interest
in Tamagotchi thus clearly resides elsewhere than the interface
itself. In this section I will argue that it is the elements, discourses,
boundaries and objects to which it refers which make it popular.
These elements in themselves are not especially new or novel,
indeed they are rather familiar, close and almost naive.
Heidegger argues that what is closest to us is precisely what is
most hidden,24 so in the case of Tamagotchi, what has been
capitalised on by the manufacturers is the very proximity of
caring-for relations which are deemed necessary in our current
culture and which are not usually associated with a computer
interface. So it is the bringing together of a number of different
realms (the animal /machine/ human, care and nurturance) into
the one symbolic object which makes it so new and exciting.
The configurations from which Tamagotchi takes its meaning can
be generally located within the domestic sphere: children, play,
toys, pets and nurturance or mothering. Tamagotchi were
supposedly created by a Japanese mother whose child could not
have a real p e t,25 and it was initially marketed to young Japanese
girls. However, its popularity grew far beyond this group,
transgressing the usual gender and age barriers for toys of its
genre.
adding new layers to it.' Wolfgang Schirmacher, ’Homo Generator: Media and
Postmodern Technology’ in G. Bender & T.Druckey, eds., Cultures on the Brink:
Ideologies of Technology (Bay Press, Seattle, 1994), p. 67.
24 Paul Ricoeur uses Heidegger's thesis to explain why the distinction between
what appears and what is hidden is not too sharp (this is in the context of
explaining his use of both phenomenology and hermeneutics). Charles E. Reagan,
’Interview with Paul Ricoeur June 19, 1982’ in Paul Ricoeur: His Life and Work
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996), p. 4.
25 Tamagotchi Website: Bandai Corp. 1997.
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It is worth staying with the marketed image of Tamagotchi for a
while, for it is here that the connections to the 'real' world are
most explicitly being forged. We have to be careful however, for
marketing itself works in a similar way to the virtual. It creates
and fixes the very market it is seeking to sell its product to. Like
the virtual, it does not simply represent (and then satisfy) a
consumer's previously unfulfilled desires. These images actively
shape and mediate how the object or text is received and
experienced.26
The marketing discourses of Bandai (the manufacturers and
distributors of Tamagotchi) specifically work to solidify the idea
that children can learn to act responsibly through being in contact
with pets. Revisiting the opening quote of this article by a Bandai
representative (It is more than a toy, it is a learning device...it
teaches people to become responsible, to care for something, like a
pet/) we can see how the phrase 'like a pet' grounds the claim that
has just been made. It is assumed that by looking after an 'other'
being, children learn an ethical and moral lesson of care. I do not
doubt that a sense of morality or ethics is learnt from the contact
between pet and child, but does it then follow that what is learnt
is 'right' and 'natural'? What is being learnt is a culturally specific
set of rules and moral codes of permissible behaviour.
Hegel situates the importance of the domestic setting as the site
wherein ethics are formed in the subject.27 This realm has been
overtly coded feminine and private and been demonstrated as
such by feminist theory. In Western culture it has been somewhat
locked out of the realm of public discourse and knowledge.
Likewise reason has been privileged over passion and emotion,28
26 The media often later picks up on these marketed groups, using them to describe
the current social milieu. For example Linda Lee writes of Western adolescents
'why not just call them the Tamagotchi Generation? They like things
technological and cute (like the 1995 movie Babe), they are open to the global
marketplace and they insist on their right to irony. And unlike the electronic
pets called Tamagaotchis, the Tamagotcheratis will never die as long as
marketing people are willing to push their buttons/ Linda Lee 'Grunge gets the
boot in bright new world of idoldom', The New York Times, March 13,1998, p.24.
27 Hegel's position is discussed in Selya Benhabib, ’The generalised and the
concrete other’ in E. Frazer, J. Hornsby & L. Lovibond, eds., Ethics: A Feminist
Reader (Blackwell, London,1992) p. 248.
28 Alison Jagger, ’Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology’,
Inquiry , 32, 1989, p.151. This realm, and the bodies that support it (the mothers'
bodies) are described as natural: childbirth and childrearing is assumed to be one
of the most ’natural’ occurrences of the human condition. Many feminists have
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and the relation has been 'naturalised'. So we can start to see why
Tamagotchi were initially marketed to young girls, because girls
traditionally learn mothering behaviour through playing with
dolls and mimicking their own mothers' nurturance and
responsiveness to others. The fact that Tamagotchi have become
popular beyond this limited category is perhaps testimony to the
actual fluidity of these roles, that they are not grounded in a
feminine bodily 'reality' of the capacity for childbirth, but are
rather taught and learned behaviours.
Tamagotchi explicitly plays on and constructs its close proximity
to the domestic. By making virtual a relation of nurturance and
imitation (ie children pretending to be adults, especially mothers)
what is simulating gets broken down into a manageable program
of feeding, affection, health and punishment. The fact that it can
be virtualised so easily is shocking partly because it is too close to
what already occurs. As well as this the nostalgic idealisation of
the domestic and nurturance is revealed to involve practices
usually found in the public domain: that is time management
and programming. The romanticised 'natural' realm of the
private and domestic is shown to be easily replicated and made
into a computer program.
Tronto describes the 'nurturance' most often acted by mothers as
an ethical system based on the relation of ’caring-for’ another
(which is in contrast to a masculinist public ’caring-about’
relation).29 In section three I will take up this idea of the 'caringchallenged this status of the ’natural’ in relation to women and childrearing,
identifying the discursive power relations that hold it in place as a dominant
ideology. See for example E. Martin, The Woman in the Body: A Cultural
Analysis of Reproduction , (Open University Press, London, 1987); Elizabeth
Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism (Allen & Unwin, Sydney,
1994); and P. Treichler ’Feminism, Medicine and the Meaning of Childbirth’ in
M.Jacobus et.al. eds., Body Politics: Women and the Discourses of Science
(Routledge, London, 1990).
29 Joan Tronto, ’Women and Caring: what can feminists learn about morality from
caring’ in A.M. Jagger &
S.R. Bordo, eds., Gender, Body, Knowledge: Feminist Constructions of Being and
Knowing, (Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, 1989), p.173. The strand of
moral theory known as the ’feminist ethic of care’ stresses the exclusion of women
from traditional Western moral theory as well as women's sense of morality as
being less about abstract situations than caring for others around them. It hints
towards an inter-subjectivity that displaces the traditional Western
patriarchal ethical systems which emphasise the individual moral subject
capable of making objective decisions from universal principles. See for example
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982).
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for/about' in Tamagotchi to show that it teaches a 'caring-about'
while simulating a 'caring-for' model of ethics.
The recognition of an 'other' as being outside of oneself reiterates
an ethical model that is provided by Levinas, that of the
recognition of finitude through the face of the other.30 It is
particularly interesting to think through this notion of ethics in
terms of the animal as 'other'. Recognition that the animal's
world is outside of our complete comprehension and
understanding does force the human subject to acknowledge their
own finitude to some degree. What is questionable is whether
this can occur in either the pet or virtual pet relation. Here the
interpretations and encounters with the 'other' are already so
prescribed and pre-figured that any 'otherness' is easily concealed.
By responding to an 'other' that has been programmed by another
human to call for you (ie the Tamagotchi), are we thus able to
recognise our finitude and thus ethical situatedness? I would like
to leave this larger question open.
The other-ness of the pet is often concealed by the common
human treatment of the pet as a child. For example language that
is spoken to both infants and pets has been referred to as
'm otherese'31). Thus the interpretation of the animal is not one
that is totally open to the world of the other, rather it is a form of
anthropomorphism that projects the subjects' identity onto the
object. It has been argued that the ’cute response’ to many animals
and pets is a kind of misplaced response to our own babies that
illicit an innate desire to nurture and protect.32 This 'innate'
desire is naturalised and made a necessary part of the grand
narrative of human evolution. What is at stake in this discourse
is the ultimate meaning and future of the 'human', any feelings

30 Levinas writes 'We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the
presence of the Other, ethics.' Immanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity
(Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1969), p. 43.
31 James Serpell writes 'People even talk to pets and children in similar ways.
Psychologists have found that, in terms of structure, the manner in which people
talk to their dogs strikingly resembles the specific kind of language, known as
"motherese", which is adopted by mothers when talking to their infants.' James
Serpel, In the Company of Animals: A Study of Human Animal Relationships,
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996), page 78.
32 Serpell attributes this idea to ethnologist Konrad Lorenz who compared the
many different animals that elicit a cute response and showed their similarities
to human infants. Similarly, Stephen Gould is quoted by Serpell as writing 'we
are fooled by an evolved response to our own babies, and transfer our reactions to
the same set of features in other animals', Ibid., p. 76.
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towards others outside of this boundary are denigrated as
misplaced and sentimental.
As children, we play with toys and dolls by making them 'alive'.
Similarly we construct a world of human reference for animals (a
form of anthropomorphism) in order to interpret their
behaviour.
The
boundaries
implied
by
the
term
'anthropomorphism' (between human and the animal) are not
necessarily realisable to the child, rather these boundaries are
learned later. Midgely writes that children slip more easily
between the world of humans and animals, the boundaries
between them having not yet been fully learned.33 I would extend
this observation to the division between the real and the artificial
and virtual. As adults, we may ’know’ the rules in a formal sense,
but our everyday relation to things suggests that the childhood
animism I have identified may never be fully grown out of. Such
animism could even be called a form of virtualisation or
narrativisation, a world is constructed that is related to (but not
quite) the one that is partly concealed. Our worlding and
techniques of interpretation precede our very experiences of the
object so that our encounter with it is meaningful.
If we add to this picture the boundary between the human and
machine we can witness the high degree of anthropomorphism
(behaviours such as talking to one's computer, responding to the
television etc) that circulate beyond the domain of games. The
toys that adults play with (cars, boats, computers, mobile phones)
are just more complicated and expensive. Tamagotchi as 'virtual
pets' reveal that the boundary between the animal and machine
is only meaningful to the human. They play on these dynamics
and uncertainties over boundaries, turning the 'animal' into the
'machine', an image already prefigured by Descartes' influential
image of the automaton. What Tamagotchi reveal to us is the
way in which we already virtualise most of our relations with
others'.
By virtualising an already unsure distinction,
Tamagotchi confuse our ability to make a clear moral judgement;
the grounds on which such judgements are usually made have
been shifted.

33Mary Midgely, 'The Mixed Community’ in E.C.Hargrove, ed., Animal Rights/
Environmental Ethics (State University of New York Press, New York, 1992), p.
218.
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Section 3: The World Before the Text:
What can we learn from Tamagotchi?
As is suggested by the phrase 'the fusion of horizons', the complex
processes of encountering and interpreting a text involves an
activity of transformation. Something occurs in this encounter
between the text and the reader (or the game and the player as in
the case of Tamagotchi) which changes both of them. Ricoeur
describes this as the world or story encountered in the text being
appropriated, becoming part of the subject's own story or world.
Because any encounter is situated within a complex field of
relations, objects, meanings and their interconnections, it will
have a number of different consequences perhaps not even
immediately apparent. Ricoeur stated in an interview :
Interpretation is not limited to the boundary of the text.
As soon as we raise the problem of appropriation or
application, then we go out of the world of the texts and
to the field of life and action. And then we are
confronted by ethical questions and political questions.34
There has been much concern over the possible effects the
'virtual' may have on the ’real’. Such concern expresses an
anxiety over the possible replacement of the real by the virtual.
For instance, Kruger asks: 'will real action lose its immediacy
when it is but a replication of a simulated activity?'35 Though I too
share in some anxiety over virtuality, what I have attempted to
show is that the 'real' or 'immediate' is not only effected by the
virtual, but is actually constructed by it. It is difficult to identify
which one comes first for the virtual is anticipated in advance of
our contact with it, then it actively constructs the world from
which we supposedly come. This movement can be recognised as
what is known as the hermeneutic circle.
Tamagotchi complicates the picture, because it is directly working
on and fictionalising the world of praxis (ie by making a 'pet' that
we have to respond to). However, we have to look beyond the
confines of the game itself into the fields of its many
consequences in order to see what political and ethical changes it
is effecting. The term 'consequence' suggests a linearity (a cause
and effect model) which conceals the more complex movements
34 Paul Ricoeur quoted in Reagan 'Interview 1982', p.10.
35 Myron Kruger, 'Foreword' to Michael Heim, The Metaphysics of Virtual
Reality (Oxford University Press, New York, 1993), p. x.
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of 'worlding' that I have laboured to articulate in my analysis of
Tamagotchi. Once we put Tamagotchi back into the everyday
contexts of its use (ie in the overtly saturated universe of media,
the virtual, images, objects, toys and the plethora of useless
gadgets) we can start to see how the linearity suggested by
'consequence' starts to become confused. Baudrillard writes: 'the
anticipation of reality by images, the precession of images and
media in relation to events, such that the connection between
cause and effect becomes scrambled and it becomes impossible to
tell which is the effect of the other.'36 Tamagotchi, as virtual pets,
reveal to us the scrambling and complexity of the relation
between reality and the virtual, turning nurture into a
naturalised virtuality.
Following on from the contexts described above, perhaps one of
the reasons Tamagotchi has become so popular is that it feeds
directly on our sense of increasing inability to be able to determine
and fully comprehend our effects. As subjects (who gain our very
'subjectivity' through the reflection of ourselves in others and
through the interpretation of texts 37), we seem to have developed
the desire to make something respond to us and to which we
have immediate and eventually dire effects.
By broadening the ethical model of consequence out from its close
proximity to subjectivity to a more complex system of
relationality, we are able to start to make connections outside of
our immediate anthropocentric worlds. Revealing the material
life-cycle of the Tamagotchi (as was demonstrated in Section Two)
is one way of working against the complete hegemony of the
narratives of 'life' as constructed in the image of 'virtual life'. No
matter how immaterial, imaginative and ethereal virtual worlds
such as Tamagotchi appear to be, they are still contained within
the finitudinal boundary of human interpretative ability. A 'real'
dog would not immediately interpret a Tamagotchi 'egg' as a
rival. However, the dog may notice that this object is taking up
human attention and changing behaviour. By using this example
I am forced into an anthropomorphism which projects a certain
36 Jean Baudrillard, The Evil Demon of Images, translated by Paul Patton & Paul
Foss (Power Publications, Sydney, 1987), p. 19.
57 Paul Ricoeur writes: 'what is interpreted in a text is the proposing of a world
that I might inhabit and into which I might project my ownmost powers' and
later: 'The shortest route from the self to itself is through the images of others.'
Paul Ricoeur quoted in Kearney, 'Paul Ricoeur and the Hermeneutic Imagination',

P-17.
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image of the 'other' in order to illustrate yet another hum anmeaning.
By making pets 'virtual', is it possible that 'real' animals may be
relieved from the burdens of human subjectivism? The abuse
animals are subjected to through our attention (or lack of it) could
be a way of lessening negative human impacts on the animal
domain. But this consideration opens up a larger, more
problematic question. If animals are no longer to serve as our
pets, where will they go and how will they survive? Is there room
in our vision of the future (a world projected which effects our
current world) for animals beyond our use of them as 'standing
reserve'? The increasingly enframed and designed worlds in
which we live have less and less time and space for others to exist
in their own autonomy. The enframing of our modern
technologised lives Heidegger argues is capable only of revealing
to us our own image.
Although animals are made to be our foils (especially pets),
encountering them at least forces humans to recognise our own
finitude and capacity to be open to the world of genuinely alterior
'other'. To paraphrase Gadamer, in any genuine questioning
(which this article has sought to be) there is a wall of negativity
which is faced, and this is the knowledge of 'not knowing'.3
839 I
would argue that Tamagotchi's 'otherness' gets concealed by their
momentum and interpretation as sign. The caring-for relation
which they seemingly encourage is actually packaged into a more
generalised caring-about that does not have to confront the
knowledge of 'not knowing'.
Because in an ecological/relational framework everything has
effect, it is a moot point that something is indeed being effected by
Tamagotchi's presence and use. Thus my concern over the ethical
models being taught and learnt by an encounter with Tamagotchi
is one of caring-for what is being effected by their use. What is
taught is a generalised type of care that pays little heed to the
complexity of responses needed for changing situations. W hat
Tamagotchi (as consumer item) does is market and package
’ethics’. I have argued that such a form of 'ethics' is actually
38 Martin Heidegger, 'A Question Concerning Technology' in The Question
Concerning Technology and Other Essays (Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1977)
pp. 26-27. This modem technological enframing (or Gestell) is only capable of
revealing the world as 'standing reserve' to the human.
39 Gadamer quoted in Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 198.
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unethical because the consequence is that ethics can then be
disposed of once the fad is over. In the mean-time our idea of
what 'care', 'response' and ultimately 'ethics' are have been
transformed, and it is a world which we all now inherit.

Biography
Annie O'Rourke graduated from Sydney University with
Honours from the Women's Studies Department in 1997 for
which she was awarded the University Medal. Her honours thesis
(entitled 'What does Cloning create?') was a hermeneutic and
ethical interpretetaion o f cloning in both its animal and
(potential) human manifestations. She has a long standing
interest in issues about animals, anthropocentrism, technology
and sustainability, and intends to pursue these and related topics
in future studies and writing. She is presently working fo r the
EcoDesign Foundation (a Sydney based research, education and
consultancy organisation) as a desk top publisher, researcher and
contributer to the monthly Jounal 'Information Ecology'.

20

